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THE USE OF FORCE AND TERRORISM 
*Tijana Šurlan 
Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Belgrade 
 
Abstract: The author explores the main features of international public law – 
the use of force and the right to self-defence in the light of terrorist acts. The 
main point is that terrorism itself is not the international public law notion. A 
huge number of treaties and norms regulating terrorism in terms of 
international public law regulate cooperation among states in suppression 
and sanctions of terrorist acts. If an armed attack occurs creating a terrorist 
attack, a state can apply its right to self-defence only if these acts can be 
attributed to a state, either as acts of states de jure or de facto organs.  
Key words: the use of force, the right to self-defence, armed attack, terrorist 
act, state responsibility, attribution of acts to a state. 
 
Contemporary international legal order is built on the norms prohibiting the 
use of force (Tams, 2009). These norms emerged from the classical jus ad bellum, 
changing its character in the essence (Condoreli, Naqvi, 2004; Schmitt, 2007; Pejic, 
2007). While in the classical international law the use of force was the usual manner of 
communication between states, regulating just the pattern of commencing the war, 
nowadays the use of force is generally prohibited, allowing its use exceptionally.  
The use of force is formulated as the principle, as the set of norms, both 
treaty and customary and as the unifying value of the international community 
(Cassese, 1986; Gray, 2008). The Charter of the United Nations embodies it in all its 
functions and presents general normative framework regulating the use of force1. 
The United Nations, as the subject of international law and international relations, 
                                                           
* E-mail: tijana.milosevic@kpa.edu.rs 
1 The Use of Force and the role of the UN in it has been under deliberation at the International Court of Justice 
on several occasions; in the case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (the Democratic Republic of 
Congo v. Uganda) it is stated that the “prohibition against the use of force is a cornerstone of the United Nations Charter” 
and concluded that “Article 51 of the Charter may justify a use of force in self-defence only within the strict confines there 
laid down”, all other cases are in the recourse to the Security Council, Judgment, par. 148; see also other cases instituted 
from the Democratic Republic of Congo against Burundi and Rwanda on armed activities, cases instituted from 
Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro against the United States of America and other members of NATO on Legality of Use 
of Force, cases Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. the United States), Case 
concerning Oil Platforms (the Islamic Republic of Iran v. the United States of America) 
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was created with primary task to preserve international peace and security. The task, 
goal and aim of the UN are all created on the common value of liberty and freedom. 
Thus, the use of force and its exceptions should be understood in this manner.  
Rules regulating the use of force, in the UN Charter as well as in the 
customary law2, are addressing the states (Gazzini, 2005). The general presumption 
was that the use of force, either lawful or unlawful, would be only states’ prerogative. 
Exceptionally, it could be manifested on behalf of non-state actors, for example in 
internal wars or revolutions, in liberation movements during state-creation process, 
occupying contemporary position of the subject of the international law. Nowadays, 
possibility to use force is not only in the hands of states or liberation movements, 
but also in the hands of some other non-state actors, promoting the issue of 
understanding and applying the norms on the use of force.  
Terrorism is nowadays recognized by the international community as the 
prevailing threat to peace and security3. Yet, terrorism as a phenomenon is not new. 
Legal concept of terrorism is well known both within the international and national 
laws, with all of its following obstacles and issues on definition and elements 
(Bianchi, 2004; Maogoto, 2005). The new element is the magnitude of force that 
terrorists can achieve and use. And that is where we come to the subject of this 
paper – is it possible to use the force against terrorists? At the end, answer does 
come out as YES or NO. However, finding out which one is correct requires a great 
deal of deliberation. 
At the beginning of the analysis it is useful to make an overview of the 
existing international law norms regulating the use of force. The principle of the use 
of force, when speaking of it in terms of character of norms, is created as the 
prohibition, i.e. obligation not to undertake an action. General prohibition of the 
use of force is articulated within the Article 2 of the UN Charter: 
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” 
As such, it presents treaty law norm, regardless of the character and 
significance of the treaty in question. Besides, it is prohibited by the norms of 
customary law4. In the hierarchy of international norms this prohibition is the 
integral part of corpus of jus cogens norms, giving it raise to the highest level of 
importance and leaving no possibilities of derogation. From this point of view it 
addresses only states, or members of the UN, imposing the obligation not to use the 
force against the other state. It is not addressing to non-state actors, since 
international law basically regulates relations among states.  
                                                           
2 See Case Concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Application 28 July 
1986, par.27 
3 The most significant Security Council resolutions qualifying terrorism as a threat to peace and security are 
Resolutions 1368 of 12 . 9. 2001 and 1373 of 28. 9. 2001, following the attacks in New York, USA, 11. 9. 2001.  
4Relation between customary law norms and treaty norms on the use of force has been under deliberation at the 
International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, par. 392, 421,422,  www.icj-cij.org 
[52] NBP • Žurnal za kriminalistiku i pravo 
 THE USE OF FORCE AND TERRORISM 
Still, force can be used lawfully, thus creating the exceptions to the general 
prohibition. In the UN system force can be used as the collective military 
enforcement action taken or authorized by the UN Security Council according to 
the concept of collective security regulated in Chapter VII of the Charter (Svarc D., 
2008). States individually or collectively can also use force lawfully when defending 
themselves according to the right to self-defense.  
For the force to be used lawfully there are certain conditions to be met. When 
used by the Security Council it should be conducted by the threat to peace, breach of 
peace or act of aggression, all of them titled as such by the Council itself (Santori V., 
2006). When used by virtue of the right to self–defense, it is either according to the 
UN Charter or to the customary law norm regulating the principle of self-defense. In 
the UN Charter self–defense is defined in the Article 51 as the right. It proclaims: 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.”  
In corpus of the customary law, principle of self-defense is broader than 
Article 51 of the UN Charter (Gazzini T., 2005). In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on 
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of 
Justice stated: 
“Furthermore, the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every 
State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defense, in accordance with 
Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake” (par. 226) 
Self-defense is thus recognized as the fundamental right, the inherent right 
and as such it certainly implies concept of jus naturale (Dinstein Y., 2004). 
Notwithstanding present understanding and significance of jus natural, it still 
reminds us that some concepts cannot be changed but formulated in different 
patterns of reaction. As an inherent right of every state, it relies on its main 
characteristic, element and principle – sovereignty (Dinstein Y. 2004). In that sense 
a state is the one and the only holder of the right to decide when its survival is under 
threat and to decide on response. Normative framework of the UN Charter defined 
within the cited Article 51 is narrower (Shaw M. 2003). That means that state has 
the right to use the force as self-defense only when armed attack occurs and until 
the Security Council takes over adequate measures. Still, there is no simple legal 
formula on the armed attack.  
It is repeatedly stressed that Article 51 should be read in the conjunction with 
Article 2(4) (Dinstein Y., 2004; Gazzini T., 2005)5. Yet, there are some important 
discrepancies between them, leaving room to interpretation. The same can be 
                                                           
5 Gazzini points that application of Article 51 should be understood as the failure of the Security Council and is 
denial of Article 2(4) 
NBP • Journal of Criminalistics and Law [53] 
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stressed for the right of self-defense and its relation with the collective measures 
applied by the Security Council. While, the Security Council is the authoritative 
body to decide whether there is threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression 
and according to that decision the Council decides on adequate measure, state 
applying right to self-defense can do that only when an armed attack occurs.  
The other element, subject to which the rule addresses, is not unified. We can 
state that prohibition to use force as the principle addresses the states posing 
prohibition on them, regulating thus the relation between them. It is clear that 
prohibition is regulating inter-state relations. The principle of self-defense and the 
right of self-defense is not formulated (in clear and precise words) towards the 
attacking party. A state can be endangered and armed attacked by entities other 
than states, possessing the power to threat and attack.  
Lack of the definition and a very important element in the construction of 
the right to self-defense can be misleading towards the conclusion that the right of 
self-defense is extensive, grounding it only on the attack character. On the contrary, 
the formula of the right of self-defense is restrictive. It is confined with the character 
of attack and it is only temporary right, applicable until overtaken by the Security 
Council, essentially framed with the prohibition on the use of force. The right of 
self-defence is additionally and indirectly framed with the role of the Security 
Council. It is not framed only in terms of temporis, but also in terms of materiae in 
words “the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security”. Self-
defence can be thus invoked only when a state is endangered in terms of 
international law and international relations.  
If we agree on this interpretation, then the rules on the use of force and self-
defence do form consistent unity.  
An armed attack, the expression that is used when speaking of the right to 
self-defense, can also be named aggression. In fact, from the point of terminology it 
is legally better suited than the descriptive expression of armed attack.6 Yet, there 
are essential differences between an armed attack and aggression that in the 
outcome may influence the right of self-defense.  
Subsequently, we find ourselves posing the question – what is aggression? In 
terms of the right of self-defense it should not be treated according to the precise 
definition typical for criminal law. It should be circumscribed in a functional way 
building functional right of self-defense. This means, that if there is an act 
endangering existence of a state, as an entity, as a subject, the inherent right to 
survival is emerged and it invokes right to self-defense.  
Obviously the previous does not present an operative legal formula. The 
definition of aggression exists, adopted by the UN General Assembly, in a form of 
resolution7. It is the formula that should be followed when reasoning whether an 
attack presents aggression or not. Still, it is not a binding definition, either for 
                                                           
6 Analyzing the scope of an armed attack, Gazzini relies on the stand of the International Court of Justice stating 
“that the definition of armed attack can be found only in the customary law”, Gazzini T., op. cit., p.119. 
7 UN General Assembly Resolution 3314-XXIX, from December 14, 1974. 
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Security Council or for the states, leaving the room to other acts to be titled as acts 
of aggression. 
“The crux of the issue, therefore, is not who fired the first shot but who 
embarked upon an apparently irreversible course of action, thereby crossing the 
legal Rubicon” – let me use the wording of Professor Dinstein (Dinstein Y., 2004). 
Besides the use of force which is the evidence prima facie of aggression, aggression 
bears in itself meaning, ratio and purpose. The armed attack manifesting the 
aggression is undertaken on behalf of a state as a political entity towards the other 
state as a political entity (Rowling B.V.A, 1986). It is undertaken with a purpose of 
influencing either territorial integrity, provoking territorial reorganization – 
whether occupying it in whole or in part, or in provoking territorial reorganization 
such as secession – or in influencing the independence and sovereignty of a state. 
Aggression thus should be understood as a specific method of political 
manifestation of states goals, plans and interests towards the other state.  
In summary, an armed attack or let us say aggression is the ground for 
invoking the right of self-defense. It should be understood as the manifestation of 
politics, interests and goals of the subject of international law in the sphere of 
international relations.  
When reasoning on whether force, as the collective enforcement measure or 
the right to self-defense, can be used against terrorists the problems may arise 
following the understanding and definition of terrorism (Barrado C.M.D., 2008). 
Since this paper is not a study of terrorism itself, but of the issues on possibilities to 
use force i.e. self-defense against terrorists, there will be no analysis on definition, 
elements or other details following this phenomenon. However, from the operative 
side of analysis some key points on terrorism should be outlined.( Cryer R., 2008).  
There is no doubt that phenomenon of terrorism has been legally 
circumscribed from many different angles, resulted in plethora of conventions 
dedicated to certain aspects of terrorism. Yet, none of them has come near enough 
to the unifying and overall definition of terrorism, except the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the 
General Assembly on December 9, 1999. (Stojanovic P.C., Palevic M , 2010). As for 
the subject of this Convention and the number of State-parties8 this convention is 
marked as the “corner-stone of the struggle against terrorism”.(Gioia A., 2005). 
Article 2 of this Convention, in “two-steps approach” defines terrorism in 
terms of (1) treaties brought before this one (and “listed in the annex”) and (2) as 
“any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to 
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act”. 
Recognizing the need to regulate terrorism in the overall approach, the UN 
has been working on the draft of the Comprehensive Convention on International 
                                                          
8 The Convention has 132 signatories, 171 parties; among Permanent Members of the United Nations Security 
Council only China is not the state-party.   
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Terrorism9. Overall approach presumes an overall definition. The definition that 
has been created follows the guiding line of the previously cited definition. It states: 
“1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if 
that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:  
 Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or 
 Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public 
use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an 
infrastructure facility or the environment; or 
 Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1 
(b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, 
when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or 
abstain from doing any act.“ 
General approach and constitutive elements of both definitions thus would 
be in terms of a crime and criminal responsibility of an individual thereto. In other 
words, the definition as proposed does not cover the possible scenario of state`s 
involvement in terrorist acts. It also underlines ratio of terrorist act – influencing a 
state to do or abstain from doing an act by intimidating the population. Thus, it 
bears a political dimension, it has its impact on the main international subject, it is 
emerging as a unifying international issue and yet it is not, by definition, an institute 
of international law.  
The reasons and prevailing factors for such an approach are described 
differently – from political deals to legal philosophy of criminal law which does not 
embrace criminal responsibility of a state. From the point of view of the author of 
this article and the theory followed, the proposed definition does cover the main 
elements of the phenomenon of terrorism, as we mainly recognized it. From the 
different angle, this statement brings us to the conclusion that terrorism should not 
be understood as a notion of international public law (Higgins R ., 1997). As such, it 
cannot be undertaken by states, but only by private persons and groups of persons, 
i.e. terrorist groups. As the outcome, responsibility and sanction should be found 
elsewhere, but not in the rules of international law. 
The influence of states on terrorists, their role in terrorist’s activities and the 
fact that states can be true organizers of terrorist acts are recognized and formulated 
in the expression – “state-sponsored terrorism”. (Dupuy P.M., 2010). This 
expression is not rules-grounded or norm-governed expression, but rather theory 
grounded, politically motivated, underlining the potential role of a state in terrorist 
acts.( Becker T. 2006). From the legal point of view, there are no rules that would 
support such a combination of incompatible notions (Smith S.E., 2003).  
At this point, for the sake of truth it must be stressed that there have been 
attempts to include state element in undertaking of terrorist acts. It can be traced in 
                                                           
9 Work of the UN General Assembly on this issue has been conducted by the General Assembly`s Sixth (Legal) 
Committee and the General Assembly Ad-hoc committee on terrorism, established by the Resolution 51/210 of 17 
December 1996. Current negotiations have reached a deadlock. Under the terms of the UN General Assembly Resolution 
64/118 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism adopted on December 16, 2009, the Ad-hoc Committee shall 
continue its work on the draft on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. 
[56] NBP • Žurnal za kriminalistiku i pravo 
 THE USE OF FORCE AND TERRORISM 
the General Assembly`s resolutions, where the involvement of states in terrorism, 
either indirect or direct, has been recognized. One of the most famous is the 
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, within the 
Resolution 49/60 brought on December 9, 1994. In the paragraph II it is stated: 
“4. States, guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and other relevant rules of international law, must refrain from organizing, 
instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in territories of other States, or 
from acquiescing in or encouraging activities within their territories directed 
towards the commission of such acts”. 
Continuing, the Declaration lists methods of cooperation between states in 
prevention, suppression and combating the terrorism. But, unlike the all sectoral 
conventions and customary law it also clearly addresses to states in words: 
“5. States must… 
 … refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, financing, encouraging 
or tolerating terrorist activities and take appropriate practical measures 
to ensure that their respective territories are not used for terrorist 
installations or training camps, or for the preparation or organization of 
terrorist acts intended to be committed against other States or their 
citizens;” 
The Declaration itself is not legally binding, but it is important as the 
evidence of joint conscience. Maybe even more important, it is also evidence of the 
joint failure to create rules that would regulate this aspect of terrorism.  
If we recognize that the term “state-sponsored terrorism” is aimed to mark 
those situations, the examples when a state is indirectly taking part in terrorist acts, 
then the state should be included in the frame of notion, be recognized as an 
element of the definition (Smith, 2003). As mentioned earlier, terrorism is not the 
legal institute of international public law. Thus, there is no such institute as the 
terrorist act or terrorism supported, tolerated or organized by a state. Basically, the 
expression “state-sponsored terrorism” when titled in terms of international law 
should be adjusted either to aggression or to some other international crime as an 
actus reus (Cassese, 2006). If a state takes part in terrorist acts, these acts cannot be 
called terrorist acts anymore, as they are not terrorism, but aggression, crimes 
against humanity (Arnold, 2006) or probably some other international law institute.  
The importance of this issue is not only theoretical. It is of essential 
importance to decide what is covered by the term terrorism (Cassese, 2001). This is 
not only the matter of precise legal definition, but of the general approach. The 
stand taken on this issue would lead us to the concept of responsibility and lawful 
reaction/sanction, to the possibility to invoke the right of self-defense and to use 
force against terrorists (Salcedo, 2009).  
From the present point of view, there are two possible scenarios. If we 
preserve the concept of “state-sponsored terrorism” then the responsibility for 
terrorist acts would be applied on the state itself by means of rules of attribution. 
The concept of attribution itself is controversial, complicated and still not 
sufficiently profiled. As for the examples relating to terrorist acts with the attempts 
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to attribute them to the state, they are not encouraging at all. For an act undertaken 
by a formally non-state actor to be attributed to a state, we can rely on the Draft 
Convention of State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts.10 However 
much more important and influential is the statement of the International Court of 
Justice in the Judgment of the famous Nicaragua Case, when rules on attribution 
have been crystallized. The Court has formulated concept of “effective control over 
military and paramilitary operations” that should be exercised by a state for a 
purpose of attribution. This example is not encouraging either from the point of 
attribution or from the point of importing the concept of terrorism into 
international law. It suggests also that at the moment there is no all-in-one formula 
covering all possible situations, but instead the issues of attribution should be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis.  
Scenario no. 2 would keep us within the framework of existing norms, 
applying them on the same situation titled differently. If terrorist acts occur with the 
obvious indicators that state is conducting them, these acts should not be treated 
either as terrorism or state-sponsored terrorism, but (most probably) as an armed 
attack or aggression. In that case Article 51 of the UN Charter as well as the 
customary rule on self-defense would be fully applicable. This example assumes that 
the attack is of the character leading to “the crossing over the legal Rubicon”. That 
means that state in question has by no means intent to suppress terrorists’ activities 
and use of force conceives as the attack and not as the self-defence (Garcia, 2009). 
The shortcoming of this, from the point of view of the most favourable version of 
international law, is in its manifestation. Terrorism in its notion contains specific 
techniques, which other hostile military activities usually do not employ. In the 
manner of expression lies the difficulty of referring to that attack as the armed 
attack, giving the ground for application of the right of self-defence. Until now, state 
practices show that states are not willing to encourage employment of the right of 
self-defence to the terrorist acts qualified as military or armed attacks. The real need 
to bring into accord terrorist hit-and-run tactics with the support of state, has been 
addressed many times. It has also given birth to various theories, such as the theory 
of necessity and proportionality, theory of “functional argument” (Tams, 2009) or 
the theory of “accumulation of events” (Gazzini, 2005)11 or accumulation doctrine. 
None of them became operative or legally accepted, leaving thus reaction of states to 
the terrorist acts/armed attacks on the case-by-case basis.  
Scenario no. 3 is purely theoretical since there is no hint in reality that 
compromise and deal on these elements could be reached in foreseeable future. 
According to this scenario state`s involvement in terrorist acts, should be included 
as in the definition itself, with the position of constitutive element, giving it meaning 
and position of the international law institute, leading to the direct responsibility of 
                                                           
10After several decades of deliberation the ILC has formulated the last version of the Convention in 2001. This 
version is cited in this paper.  
11This theory has been elaborated by Israel since 1950, and is used as the ground for the use of force in 
numerous occasions grounding it on Article 51 of the UN Charter.  
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a state and directly to applying the right to self-defense or other form of 
reaction/sanction towards the state conducting terrorist acts.  
 In order to legally justify armed activity undertaken by virtue of the right to 
self-defense, a state should not be defending itself from terrorist`s armed attack. The 
attacked state should rely on the fact that terrorist acts are undertaken on behalf of a 
state and as such invoke the right to self-defense. If a terrorist attack occurs, from the 
territory of another state, when that state does not organize or support terrorist group, 
the attacked state could not invoke its right to self-defense. Still, it can use force. 
States can use “anti-terrorist force” (Tams, 2009) on the territory of the other 
state, with purpose to neutralize terrorist groups, with the consent of that state or in 
alliance with it. In this example though, it would not be self-defense in the sense of 
the right to self-defense when armed attacked, but cooperation between states in 
suppressing terrorism. 
The real threat that is posed for states by terrorists and the level of gravity of 
terrorist attacks has influenced international community, but unfortunately not 
simultaneously. Today, we have plenty of norms treating terrorism, yet none 
comprehensively defining it on the international level nor creating the system of 
reactions to it or measures/sanctions that can be applied.  
There is one important mark of international norms governing terrorism 
that has to be stressed. Plethora of norms concerning terrorism, huge majority of 
them contained in sectoral conventions, address to states and they are created 
among states giving them character of international law norms (Elagab, Elagab, 
2007). Meritum of all of these norms, hence, is not in regulating inter-state relations, 
but in their mutual agreement on steps that are to be taken as on terrorism in order 
to prevent and suppress it (San Jose, 2009). Vast majority of the international law 
norms are thus creating duties on state parties for the convention to be fulfilled 
within their national law – criminal (concerning either readjustments in their 
criminal code, definitions of crimes, elements of crimes, or obligations concerning 
prevention and sanction of certain types of terrorist acts), banking law, production 
of weapons, explosions, security issues, etc.  
Another important part of them is regulating cooperation among states in 
mutual efforts of suppressing terrorism within their borders. Cooperation among 
states in combating terrorism is generally in terms of exchanging information about 
terrorist groups and their activities, in cooperation on revealing them and exchanging 
of evidence, in cooperation in terms of extradition, etc. (Proulx, 2005). When it comes 
to the use of force against terrorists there are no rules, that field is not regulated. It 
thus brings the analysis into the sphere of general international law institutes. 
In other words, states were not creating norms on terrorism vis-à-vis one 
another, which resulted in the previously drawn conclusion that terrorism itself is 
not the notion of international law. 
In conclusion, as it was stipulated previously in the text, a clear positive or 
negative answer on the use of force and self-defence against terrorist attacks will be 
formulated. In simple formulas it would be structured as follows: 
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 A state can apply the right of self-defence against terrorist acts, amounting 
to arm attack, if those acts are committed on behalf of the state either 
according to the terms of the attribution or according to the shift of those 
acts to the international law institute; 
 A state can use force against terrorists (either individuals or groups) on the 
territory of another state, with that states consent and as a part of 
assistance or mutual combat against terrorists. According to this 
scenario, a state using the “anti-terrorist force” would not be in the 
breach of the general prohibition on the use of force.  
Besides these two formulas – simple and self-understanding, but yet very 
narrow and restrictive, there are some vague loopholes that cannot be covered by 
them. For example – can the Security Council directly use force against terrorists? 
What if a state from whose territory terrorist attacks occur does not want armed 
force cooperation with the other (attacked) state? Does it place “anti-terrorist force 
cooperation” into the breach of prohibition on the use of force?  
As far as the first question is concerned, legally speaking the Security Council is 
equipped with broader rights as to the reaction on crisis in international community 
and wrongful attitude manifested by states. When a terrorist act occurs the Security 
Council is authorized to decide on the character of the act and its influence on the 
international peace and security (Laborde, DeFeo, 2006). Using its prerogatives the 
Security Council can, under Article 41 of the UN Charter, decide on measures and 
invite the UN Members to apply them. In the attitude towards the Security Council 
resolution, a state can manifest its attitude toward the terrorist act taken from its 
territory. As far as the use of force is under observation, a simple answer would also 
come out as positive, again with the same assumptions on state involvement in the 
terrorist attack (Carnero, 2009). Not only is the Security Council authorized to use 
force against terrorists, but it should hold the leading role in it, in the sense of 
collective security system and Article 24 of the Charter12. Also, in the pure logical 
sense of reasoning, if it is stated that a state can apply the right of self-defence to a 
terrorist attack, the right that is framed within the Security Council`s prerogatives, it is 
self-understanding that the SC holds the same rights (Fassbender, 2004). The ground 
for rethinking on the Security Council`s prerogatives thus does not lay on the black-
lettered law, but on its practice. The Security Council has been very active in 
addressing the issues of terrorism and conclusions on urge to regulate this area in 
precise manner. On the other hand, it remained quite passive. So far, the Security 
Council has not authorized the use of force as a military sanction against terrorists. 
Yet, states have been active and force that has been used titled as the right of self-
defence. The Security Council did not either follow them in their efforts of defending 
or apply a measure towards them as for the breach of a prohibition not to use force.  
As for the other question, this is not a typical example of loophole or paralysis 
of law, but more a fact-dependent distribution of constitutive elements of a case 
                                                          
12Article 23: 1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the 
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in 
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.  
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(Bassiouni, 1988). The attitude of a state whose territory has been used for organizing 
and conducting terrorist acts can be one of the elements in the process of attribution. 
On the other hand, the principle of sovereignty does allow a state to refuse forceful 
cooperation from the other states, without referring to substantial involvement.  
By this example, we do come to the end of the topic. The right of self-defence is 
restrictive and it does not come in straight forward application on the acts of terrorism.  
In terms of comparison, the right of self-defence is weaker than the principle of 
sovereignty. If misused, it can be qualified as the breach of prohibition on the use of 
force. It would then lead to application of the right of self-defence vice versa. Thus, it 
can create a closed circle. Ban of force does not prohibit use of force against terrorists 
as such; it applies in international relations between states. However, the use of force 
against terrorists based in another country can be treated as an armed attack.  
From the point of view of real needs and events in the contemporary world, 
this outcome of the analysis is not satisfactory. The lack of regulations is evident, as 
well as the inability of the international community to find an acceptable approach. In 
order to regulate a response of the international community and states unilaterally to 
acts of terrorism, either supported by a state or not, the priority is an agreement on 
definition, i.e. if it includes the state as a constitutive element, which would ipso facto 
conduct issues on responsibility of state, as well as the issue of sanctions.  
Ratio of the International law requires the connection with substantive 
international law, with principles of international law and inclusion of terrorism 
into the system of international law. Terrorism guided only in criminal law terms 
and exclusively as the crime is not adequate for the international law system. It 
leaves a huge and very important area of contemporary relations legally uncovered, 
imprecise and thus easy for misuse. As for the final conclusion and also as a task pro 
futuro finalizing of comprehensive convention or creation of customary norms 
would be the best way to adjust the real needs to the legal framework.  
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UPOTREBA SILE I TERORIZAM 
Rezime 
Članak je posvećen proučavanju mesta terorizma u sistemu međunarodnog 
javnog prava, s posebnim osvrtom na upotrebu sile i prava na samoodbranu. 
Autor konstrukciju gradi na stavu da terorizam nije institut međunarodnog 
javnog prava, tj. da su odnosi između subjekata međunarodnog javnog prava 
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povodom terorizma izgrađeni isključivo radi koordinacije i kooperacije, a ne 
uređenja ponašanja subjekata kao aktivnih činilaca u terorističkim aktima. 
Ovakav polazni stav ima duboke posledice na pravo da se upotrebi sila i pravo 
da se proklamuje pravo na samoodbranu. Autor gradi stav da upotreba sile i 
samoodbrana mogu doći u obzir i u slučaju terorističkih akata, pri čemu u 
takvoj situaciji teroristički akti menjaju svoju fizionomiju i postaju akti države, 
kvalifikovani u smislu nekog drugog instituta međunarodnog javnog prava, 
po opštim pravilima o odgovornosti kako direktne, tako i indirektne. 
 
